Category: General News

  • Children’s Mental Health Provision in England Is in Freefall, and CAMHS Waiting Lists Tell Only Half the Story

    Children’s Mental Health Provision in England Is in Freefall, and CAMHS Waiting Lists Tell Only Half the Story

    The headline figures are bad enough. Across England, more than 400,000 children and young people are currently waiting for mental health support through Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services, according to NHS data published earlier this year. But the number itself is almost beside the point. What CAMHS waiting lists cannot capture is the texture of the crisis: the 14-year-old sitting with her GP for the fourth appointment in three months because there is nowhere else to refer her, the exhausted school counsellor absorbing caseloads that would test a senior clinician, the parent ringing 111 at 2am because their child is in crisis and the local crisis team is at capacity.

    Young person in a therapy session, representing the realities behind CAMHS waiting lists in England
    Photo by Mikhail Nilov on Pexels

    I’ve spoken to parents, clinicians, and charity workers across the Midlands and the North over the past few weeks, and the picture they describe is not one of isolated failure. It is systemic. The architecture of children’s mental health provision in England was already strained before the pandemic; what happened after 2020 did not create the problem, it simply removed the last structural buffers. What we are left with is a service that is, in many areas, operating as a crisis response rather than a health service.

    The postcode lottery that determines a child’s chances

    Provision varies so dramatically between NHS integrated care board areas that it is genuinely difficult to describe CAMHS as a single national service. In some parts of London, children with moderate anxiety can access therapy within eight weeks. In rural areas of Lincolnshire, Cumbria, and coastal Suffolk, the same referral might result in a wait of eighteen months or more. The NHS England data dashboard for children’s mental health shows access rates ranging from under 30 per cent to over 50 per cent depending on the integrated care board, yet national targets treat these areas as equivalent.

    This is not simply a staffing problem, though staffing is acute. It is also a commissioning problem. Integrated care boards have significant discretion over how mental health budgets are allocated, and children’s services have historically lost out in competition with urgent adult provision. The children’s mental health charity Young Minds has been raising this point for years, but in 2026 the evidence has become harder to dismiss. Referral thresholds in some areas have been raised so high that children presenting with moderate depression and self-harm are told they do not meet criteria for CAMHS intervention, and are instead directed towards school-based support that is itself chronically underfunded.

    Why children keep ending up in A&E

    A&E is not a mental health setting. The wards are loud, the waits are long, and the staff, however well-meaning, are not trained as child psychiatrists. Yet for thousands of children each year, a trip to the emergency department is the only point of genuine contact with mental health provision they will get. NHS England figures show that mental health presentations by under-18s at A&E increased by around 22 per cent between 2019 and 2025, and the trend has not reversed.

    Child waiting in A&E, illustrating the pressure on emergency departments caused by CAMHS waiting list failures
    Photo by RDNE Stock project on Pexels

    The logic, perverse as it sounds, is rational. A child who presents at A&E in crisis cannot be turned away. The threshold for intervention there is clinical risk, not the commissioning criteria that govern CAMHS referrals. So families have learnt, or been quietly advised, that acute presentation is sometimes the only route into the system. One GP in Sheffield told me, candidly, that she would not normally suggest this to a family but that she had done so in cases where a child had been waiting over a year and was deteriorating. That a doctor should find herself in that position is a measure of how far the system has failed.

    The consequences ripple outward. Paediatric wards end up holding children in mental health crisis for days or weeks because there is no suitable inpatient psychiatric bed available. NHS data from 2025 showed that on any given day, an average of 90 children in England were being held in paediatric wards solely for mental health reasons, waiting for a placement. These beds cost far more than community-based early intervention would, and they deliver far worse outcomes.

    Early intervention: permanently promised, never properly funded

    The phrase “early intervention” has appeared in every children’s mental health strategy document produced by the Department of Health since at least 2011. It appears in the NHS Long Term Plan. It appears in the government’s SEND review. It will, I would wager, appear in whatever strategy document follows this one. What it has not consistently appeared in is the actual budget allocations at local level, where the decisions that determine a child’s access to care are actually made.

    The structural problem is that early intervention spending produces results over years, not quarters. A child who receives good therapeutic support at 12 is less likely to present in crisis at 15, less likely to require inpatient care at 17, less likely to struggle with employment and housing at 25. These outcomes are real but diffuse, and they accrue across multiple budgets and departments. The Treasury does not receive credit for a crisis that did not happen. So the investment keeps being deferred in favour of crisis response, which is more expensive and less effective, but more legible to short-term spending cycles.

    There is also a workforce dimension that is rarely discussed plainly. Training a child and adolescent psychotherapist takes years. The pipeline is not something any government can fix quickly even if the political will exists. In 2026, NHS England estimates a shortage of roughly 1,200 qualified CAMHS clinicians across England. Universities are training more, but recruitment into NHS roles, against a private sector that pays considerably better, remains a persistent drag. The gap between children from different socioeconomic backgrounds in accessing quality support is widening alongside the clinical workforce shortage, compounding disadvantage in the most straightforward way possible.

    What schools are being asked to absorb

    In the absence of functional early intervention, schools have become the de facto first tier of mental health provision for most children in England. This is not what they were designed for. A school counsellor with a caseload of 80 young people cannot provide the evidence-based therapeutic input that a trained CAMHS clinician would. They can listen, refer, and support in a general sense, but they cannot substitute for clinical care.

    The government’s Mental Health Support Teams, rolled out to expand school-based provision, have been welcomed by headteachers but are not yet anywhere near universal coverage. As of early 2026, they reach approximately 45 per cent of pupils in England. The remaining 55 per cent are in schools that have whatever their own budget allows, which in many cases is little beyond a part-time counsellor funded through the pupil premium. The parallel with other infrastructure crises is not subtle; as I’ve written previously about the physical state of school buildings, the invisible infrastructure of pastoral and mental health support is deteriorating alongside the brickwork.

    The strain is showing in teacher retention as much as in pupil outcomes. Staff are leaving roles partly because the pastoral burden has become unmanageable. A head of year is not a social worker or a therapist, but in many schools they are functioning as both. That is not a sustainable model, and the wider pattern of skilled professionals leaving public sector roles because the conditions are untenable applies here as sharply as anywhere.

    What would actually help

    I am cautious about adding to the long list of policy recommendations that have not been implemented, but a few things are reasonably clear from the evidence. Ring-fenced funding for CAMHS that cannot be raided at integrated care board level would address one of the most consistent failure points. A serious expansion of the educational pipeline for child and adolescent mental health clinicians, with bursaries to compete with the private sector, would begin to address the workforce gap over a five to seven-year horizon. And a genuine shift in how early intervention outcomes are measured and rewarded across departmental budgets would require Treasury agreement, which is the hardest part of all.

    None of this requires novel ideas. Every one of these proposals has appeared in a review or strategy document within the past decade. The gap is not knowledge but political priority. In the meantime, the families waiting for CAMHS appointments, the GPs making referrals they know will take eighteen months to process, and the A&E departments absorbing what the community system cannot, are all paying the cost of a structural failure that successive governments have been content to acknowledge and defer. Incidentally, one of the more creative uses of technology I have seen in community health engagement recently was a charity in Bristol using 3d print services to produce tactile therapeutic tools for young people with sensory processing difficulties, a small example of how resource-constrained services are finding unusual solutions. It should not have to be unusual.

  • The English Devolution Experiment: What Giving Mayors More Power Actually Looks Like in Practice

    The English Devolution Experiment: What Giving Mayors More Power Actually Looks Like in Practice

    There is a version of this story in which metro mayors are quietly transforming English cities, cutting through bureaucracy, commanding serious investment and making decisions that Whitehall would have sat on for a decade. There is another version in which the whole devolution settlement is an elaborate performance: powers handed over with such conditions attached that the people receiving them can barely move. In 2026, both versions are true, simultaneously, depending on which city you’re standing in and which Tuesday of the month it is.

    Empty council chamber representing English devolution mayors 2026 decision-making structures

    The English devolution mayors 2026 story is not a simple triumph or a cautionary tale. It is messier and more instructive than either. Greater Manchester and the West Midlands are the two most-watched experiments, and what they reveal about the limits and genuine possibilities of devolved power in England deserves a closer read than the headlines usually afford.

    What Greater Manchester has actually achieved

    Andy Burnham’s Manchester is the closest England has to a genuinely functioning city-region government. The integrated transport authority, Transport for Greater Manchester, now controls the Bee Network, a reintegrated bus system that, since franchising replaced the deregulated free-for-all in 2023, has expanded routes and brought fares under public control. By early 2026, the Bee Network covers all ten Greater Manchester districts. Patronage is up. The political credit is real.

    On housing, Greater Manchester’s spatial development strategy sets binding targets across the ten local authorities rather than leaving each council to argue its corner in isolation. That matters because it forces a level of regional coordination that the old structure simply couldn’t produce. The mayoral combined authority has also used its investment powers to anchor the NOMA development in the city centre and push affordable housing requirements in ways that individual local authorities, facing developer pressure alone, rarely managed.

    Skills and employment are another area where the Manchester model has delivered. The Greater Manchester Good Employment Charter, a voluntary but increasingly influential framework that over 300 employers have signed, sets standards on pay, flexible working and contracts. It is not legally binding, but it has created reputational pressure in a tight labour market. These are not nothing. They are the kinds of pragmatic, local interventions that central government, managing policy for 56 million people, consistently fails to calibrate.

    The West Midlands: a different kind of ambition

    Richard Parker, who succeeded Andy Street as West Midlands Mayor in 2024, inherited a combined authority with strong infrastructure investment credentials and genuine private-sector relationships. The West Midlands secured the UK’s largest urban regeneration zone outside London, and the Commonwealth Games legacy investment reshaped parts of Birmingham in ways that are still compounding.

    The Integrated Rail Plan, though significantly scaled back from original proposals, still positions the West Midlands for better connectivity. The region’s investment in SEND (special educational needs and disabilities) provision, using devolved skills funding, is drawing attention from other combined authorities looking for workable models. Parker has been less publicly flamboyant than Burnham, which suits a region that often felt London-centric commentary treated it as a curiosity rather than a serious economic zone.

    The West Midlands also has the most developed single settlement agreement of any English combined authority outside London, giving it pooled funding across housing, transport and skills rather than having to negotiate each pot separately. On paper, this is exactly the kind of structural shift that makes devolution meaningful. In practice, the settlement still comes with performance conditions, reporting requirements and ministerial override clauses that would make any serious regional government blush.

    Where Westminster is quietly pulling the strings

    Here is where the story gets uncomfortable. The Treasury has not surrendered fiscal control in any meaningful sense. Combined authorities receive grant settlements, they do not set their own tax rates, they cannot borrow freely against future revenues, and they cannot run deficits in the way that comparable city-regions in Germany or the United States can. When Birmingham City Council issued a Section 114 notice in 2023, effectively declaring insolvency, the mayoral combined authority had no mechanism to intervene. That structural problem has not been resolved.

    The Levelling Up and Regeneration Act 2023 created a framework for further devolution, but the pace at which powers have actually transferred has disappointed most metro mayors. The government’s own English Devolution White Paper, published in December 2024, proposed a more systematic approach to mayoral authority over planning, skills and employment support. Whether the legislation that follows actually delivers on that framing remains the central question of 2026. Early signs from the government’s English devolution policy documents suggest genuine intent, but the Treasury’s grip on capital spending means intent and delivery remain some distance apart.

    Transport is the clearest illustration of this gap. Outside Greater Manchester, bus franchising powers remain largely unused because the upfront cost of transitioning from deregulation is prohibitive without Treasury support. South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and the North East all have combined authorities with transport powers on paper. In reality, they are running variations of the same broken privatised bus system that has been failing passengers since the 1986 deregulation. The power exists; the funding to exercise it does not.

    The accountability question nobody wants to answer

    Metro mayors have accumulated real visibility. Burnham in particular has become a national political figure. But democratic accountability at the combined authority level remains thin. Scrutiny committees exist but lack the resources to hold well-staffed mayoral offices to account. Local ward councillors, the closest elected representatives to most residents, often find themselves excluded from decisions that directly affect their areas. This is not a reason to abandon the devolution project; it is a reason to take its democratic infrastructure as seriously as its investment pipelines.

    There are also sharp inequalities in the devolution settlement itself. The eight mayoral combined authorities in England cover around 19 million people. The remaining 37 million live in areas with either no combined authority, a county council deal without a mayor, or arrangements so recent they have yet to produce anything resembling a coherent regional strategy. Cornwall, for example, has a devolution deal but not a mayor and not the same suite of powers. Rural England, in particular, risks being left further behind as city-regions consolidate influence and investment. This connects to a broader pattern: the parts of the country least visible to Westminster have always been last in the queue. As we’ve examined in our coverage of Britain’s brain drain, the geography of economic opportunity in England remains stubbornly concentrated, and devolution has not yet proved it can correct that.

    What genuine devolution would actually require

    The countries that have made regional government work, Germany’s Länder, Spain’s autonomous communities, Scandinavian municipalities, share one characteristic that England’s combined authorities lack: genuine fiscal autonomy. The ability to raise revenue locally, borrow against it and make long-term capital commitments without ministerial approval is not a nice-to-have. It is the difference between a regional government and a regional delivery mechanism for central government priorities.

    The English devolution mayors 2026 picture is one of genuine but constrained progress. The ambition in Manchester and the West Midlands is real. The people running these combined authorities are, by and large, more pragmatic and locally informed than the departments they are trying to work around. But the constitutional settlement has not changed. England remains one of the most centralised large democracies in the developed world, and handing a mayor control of bus routes while keeping control of the money does not fundamentally alter that. The experiment is worth continuing. But calling it a revolution, at this stage, is flattering the evidence.

    For context on how Westminster’s reluctance to relinquish control manifests across other domains, our analysis of Britain’s agricultural subsidy overhaul and the leasehold reform process both demonstrate a familiar pattern: structural change promised, structural change delayed, and the gap filled with announcements rather than outcomes.

  • The Truth About Britain’s Broadband Rollout: Where Full-Fibre Reaches and Where It Has Simply Given Up

    The Truth About Britain’s Broadband Rollout: Where Full-Fibre Reaches and Where It Has Simply Given Up

    The government’s gigabit broadband target was, on paper, one of the more ambitious infrastructure pledges of recent years: full-fibre connectivity to at least 85% of UK premises by the end of 2025, with gigabit-capable broadband reaching virtually everywhere shortly after. Ofcom’s own Connected Nations report now gives us a clear-eyed account of how that promise is holding up. The short answer is: well enough if you live in a city, and not at all if you do not.

    The UK full fibre broadband rollout 2026 has genuinely accelerated. Full-fibre coverage now reaches around 60% of UK premises, up from a dismal 8% in 2019. That is real progress, and credit belongs partly to the competitive market that emerged when alternative network builders, known as altnets, piled into profitable urban territories. But acceleration in aggregate obscures a deeply uneven geography. The question that matters is not how fast the national average is moving; it is who remains on the wrong side of it.

    Rural British countryside with telegraph poles representing areas missed by the UK full fibre broadband rollout 2026

    What Ofcom’s data actually shows

    Ofcom’s Connected Nations data for 2025 makes for uncomfortable reading if you happen to live in rural England, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. In some rural areas of Wales, full-fibre availability sits below 30%. Parts of rural Scotland fare similarly. Northern Ireland has the highest overall gigabit-capable coverage in the UK, largely because of the publicly funded Project Stratum, which is itself a revealing detail. State intervention works where markets will not go.

    Urban pockets also suffer, though in different ways. Dense blocks of flats in cities like Birmingham and Leeds frequently have gigabit-capable infrastructure passing the building but no operator willing to fund the internal wiring needed to connect individual flats. Coverage maps mark these premises as served. In practice, the residents cannot get a full-fibre connection at any price. Ofcom’s own methodology counts a premises as covered if fibre passes nearby, which leads to statistics that are flattering to everyone except the person trying to work from home on a failing copper line.

    Why the commercial model is failing rural Britain

    The government’s strategy rested on a reasonable assumption: competitive commercial markets would drive rollout in profitable areas, while the £5 billion Project Gigabit programme would fund the rest through public subsidy contracts. The problem is that the boundary between commercially viable and commercially unviable has proved far more hostile than anticipated.

    Laying fibre to a village of 200 homes in Cumbria or Ceredigion costs roughly the same per property as connecting an urban terrace, but the revenue potential is a fraction of the size. Altnets, companies such as Cityfibre, Toob, and Gigaclear, have largely concentrated their capital in cities and market towns where return on investment is calculable. BT’s Openreach, to its credit, has pushed further into rural territory than most, but even Openreach has acknowledged that a meaningful percentage of UK premises will never be commercially attractive to any operator without subsidy.

    Project Gigabit contracts have been signed, and some rural communities in Devon, Lincolnshire and the Scottish Borders are finally seeing engineers at work. But the procurement process has been slow, marked by rebidding and delays that have pushed realistic completion dates well into the late 2020s for many areas. Some communities awarded contracts in 2022 are still waiting for a spade to enter the ground.

    The people who need it most are being served last

    The cruel irony of the UK full fibre broadband rollout 2026 is that the communities least well served are often those for whom reliable connectivity matters most acutely. Rural households and businesses are frequently more dependent on remote working than their urban counterparts, not by lifestyle choice but by necessity. A farmer managing procurement through an online livestock marketplace, a GP surgery attempting to run remote consultations via NHS Digital systems, a secondary school in a market town delivering hybrid lessons, all of them are operating on infrastructure designed for a different era.

    The economic consequences compound over time. The haemorrhage of skilled workers to better-connected locations is partly a broadband story. Young professionals who might otherwise remain in rural communities leave not because they dislike them but because working from a cottage in Yorkshire on a 15 Mbps ADSL connection is simply not viable in a world that expects Teams calls, cloud collaboration and video pitching as a baseline. Poor connectivity is a quiet accelerant to depopulation.

    Altnets in crisis, and what that means for coverage ambitions

    There is a further complication that barely featured in the government’s original projections. Many of the altnets that were supposed to compete Openreach into efficiency have run into serious financial difficulty. Smaller operators have consolidated, been acquired, or quietly stopped building. The altnet funding model depended on cheap capital and investor appetite that has thinned considerably as interest rates rose. Several prominent players have restructured their debt or paused rollout in 2025 and 2026, leaving behind partially built networks that serve some streets in a postcode but not others.

    This creates a new class of underserved premises: not remote farmhouses beyond the commercial frontier, but ordinary streets in provincial towns where a network was started and then stopped. Residents are sometimes unable to switch because a half-built altnet network has been registered as covering their address, deterring other operators from investing in the same area. The duplication of infrastructure in wealthy neighbourhoods alongside abandonment elsewhere has produced a market that is structurally inefficient in ways that were entirely foreseeable.

    The situation echoes broader questions about what happens when public services are left to market logic alone. Much as NHS dentistry has retreated from the areas that need it most because the funding model simply does not follow patient need, broadband infrastructure follows revenue rather than necessity. The parallel is uncomfortable but exact.

    What a genuine solution would require

    Universal service obligations exist in telecoms, BT is legally required to provide a connection of at least 10 Mbps to any premises that requests one, but 10 Mbps is an embarrassingly low floor in 2026. The government’s own £1 Gigabit Broadband Voucher Scheme, which offered households and businesses in eligible rural areas up to £4,500 towards connection costs, was oversubscribed almost immediately and has suffered repeated funding gaps. Demand exists. The money and the delivery mechanisms have not kept pace with it.

    Properly solving rural connectivity requires either a much larger and faster-moving Project Gigabit programme, or a radical revision of the universal service obligation to reflect what the digital economy actually demands. Some analysts advocate a model closer to the electricity grid: a regulated national wholesale infrastructure, with commercial operators competing on services rather than on who builds pipe to which postcode. The political appetite for that level of intervention has historically been low, though the gap between rhetoric and delivery is making the conversation unavoidable.

    The UK full fibre broadband rollout 2026 is, in aggregate, a genuine achievement. Millions of premises now have access to speeds unimaginable fifteen years ago. But aggregate statistics have a way of hiding the specific, named communities that remain on the wrong side of every chart. For them, the rollout has not moved slowly. It has not come at all. That distinction matters, and it deserves to be said plainly rather than smoothed into a national average.

    Meanwhile, broader questions about how Britain builds and funds essential infrastructure, from school buildings falling apart to fibre cables that stop at the edge of a profitable postcode, are accumulating into something that looks less like a series of isolated failures and more like a governing philosophy that has reached its limits.